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Why the U.S. Government Failed to Anticipate the Rwandan Genocide of 1994:
Lessons for Early Warning and Prevention
Matthew Levinger

George Washington University
Washington, DC, USA

Abstract: During the months leading up to the Rwandan genocide of 1994, cognitive biases obstructed the
capacity of U.S. government analysts and policymakers to anticipate mass violence against the country’s
Tutsi minority. Drawing on declassified U.S. government documents and on interviews with key current and
former officials, this essay shows that most U.S. government reporting on Rwanda before April 1994 utilized
a faulty cognitive frame that failed to differentiate between threats of civil war and genocide. Because U.S.
officials framed the crisis in Rwanda as a potential civil war, they underestimated the virulence of the threat
to Tutsi civilians and discounted the risk of catastrophic violence. The “civil war frame” also justified rigid
U.S. policy guidance that may have exacerbated ethnic and political conflicts in Rwanda on the eve of
the genocide. The phenomenon of faulty cognitive framing remains a challenge for contemporary atrocity
prevention and response efforts toward countries including Libya and South Sudan.
Keywords: Rwanda, genocide prevention, intelligence analysis, peace negotiations, framing, cognitive
biases, Arusha Accords, Libya, South Sudan, Syria
The hundred-day bloodletting in Rwanda from April through July 1994, which took more than
500,000 lives, represented one of the moral low points of the twentieth century. In a speech of March
1998, delivered on the tarmac at Kigali airport, U.S. President Bill Clinton acknowledged that the
“international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear its share of responsibility for
this tragedy.” Clinton declared that “all over the world there were people like me sitting in offices,
day after day after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with which you were
being engulfed by this unimaginable terror.”1
Most scholarship on the Rwandan genocide has rejected such claims that international
observers did not know, or “did not fully appreciate,” what was going on in Rwanda before and
during the genocide. As Samantha Power observes in her book “A Problem from Hell”: America and
the Age of Genocide:
Ahead of the April 6 plane crash [in Kigali that killed Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana
and triggered the genocide], the United States ignored extensive early warnings about
imminent mass violence. It denied Belgian requests to reinforce the peacekeeping mission.
When the massacres started, not only did the Clinton administration not send troops to contest
the slaughter, but it refused countless other options. President Clinton did not convene a
single meeting of his senior foreign policy advisers to discuss U.S. options for Rwanda.2

Many commentators have asserted that, during the months leading up to April 1994,
international observers grasped clearly the gravity and imminence of the threat of genocide in
Rwanda. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) official inquiry, Rwanda: The Preventable
Genocide, is typical in this regard:
There can be not an iota of doubt that the international community knew the following: that
something terrible was underway in Rwanda, that serious plans were afoot for even more
appalling deeds, that these went far beyond routine thuggery, and that the world nevertheless
stood by and did nothing…. There were a thousand early warnings that something appalling
was about to occur in Rwanda. If not a genocide, it was at least a catastrophe of so great a
magnitude that it should command international intervention.3
Clinton, President Bill. “Address to Genocide Survivors at the Airport in Kigali, Rwanda,” 25 March 1998. Available
from: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/text-of-clintons-rwanda-speech/ (accessed 14 January 2016).
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According to this line of analysis, the key obstacle to effective preventive action was not the failure
to comprehend the danger, but rather the inability of working-level diplomats and intelligence
analysts to draw the attention of senior policymakers to the crisis, and—after April 6—the lack of
“political will” for a robust response to the genocide.4 In Power’s words:
Simply put, American leaders did not act because they did not want to. They believed that
genocide was wrong, but they were not prepared to invest the military, financial, diplomatic,
or domestic political capital needed to stop it.5

A few scholars, however, have argued that the absence of knowledge—or perhaps the presence
of the wrong kind of knowledge—about the unfolding events in Rwanda did indeed play a critical
role in shaping responses to the genocide by the U.S. government and other international actors.
One of the earliest retrospective inquiries into this topic, published in 1996 by the OECD Steering
Committee for Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, concluded that on the eve of
the genocide:
There were significant signs that forces in Rwanda were preparing the climate and structures
for genocide and political assassinations. However, people both in the region and the
broader international community ignored, discounted or misinterpreted the significance of
these signs, thereby not only indicating an unwillingness to intervene, but communicating
that unwillingness to those who were planning genocide.6

According to the Steering Committee, international policymakers’ perceptions of the situation in
Rwanda on the eve of the genocide were colored by two events of the previous year. The first of
these events was the signing of the Arusha Accords of August 1993, which had set the terms of a
peace settlement between Rwanda’s Hutu ruling coalition and the Tutsi insurgency of the Rwandan
7 July 2000, Ch. 9, par. 1 and 16, Available from: http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/rwanda-the-preventable-genocide
(accessed 14 January 2016).
See for example Prunier, Gérard. 1995. The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. New York: Columbia University Press;
Keane, Fergal. 1995. Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey. London: Viking; Castonguay, Jacques. 1998. Les casques bleus
au Rwanda. Paris: Harmattan; Des Forges, Alison. 1999. “Leave None to Tell the Story”: Genocide in Rwanda. New York:
Human Rights Watch; Adelman, Howard and Astri Suhrke.1999. The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda
to Zaire. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers; Melvern, Linda. 2000. A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in
Rwanda’s Genocide. London: Zed Books; Melvern, Linda. 2004. Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide. London: Verso;
Gourevitch, Philip. 1998. We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda. New
York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux; Grünfeld, Fred and Anke Huijboom. 2007. The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: The
Role of Bystanders. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV; Power, A Problem from Hell; Leader, Joyce E. 2001. Rwanda’s Struggle for
Democracy and Peace, 1991-1994. Washington, D.C: The Fund for Peace; Dallaire, Roméo. 2003. Shake Hands with the Devil:
The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. Toronto: Random House Canada; Marchal, Luc. 2001. Rwanda: La descente aux enfers:
témoignage d’un peacekeeper, décembre 1993-avril 1994. Brussels: Editions Labor; Feil, Scott. 1998. Preventing Genocide: How
the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. New York:
Carnegie Corporation of New York; Straus, Scott. 2006. The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press; Official inquiries into international responses to the genocide include: the UN Report of The
Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and Statement of the SecretaryGeneral on Receiving the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in
Rwanda, 15 December 1999, available from: http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/1999/1257 (accessed 14
January 2015), France’s Rapport d’Information sur les opérations militaires menées par la France, d’autres pays et l’ONU au
Rwanda entre 1990 et 1994, available from: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dossiers/rwanda/r1271.asp (accessed 14
January 2016); the report of the Belgian Parliamentary commission of inquiry regarding the events in Rwanda, 6 December 1997,
available from: http://www.senate.be/english/rwanda.html (accessed 14 January 2016); and the Organization of African
Unity’s report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide.
4

Power, Samantha. A Problem from Hell, 508. At a 2014 conference co-sponsored by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum
and the Hague Institute for Global Justice, many of the speakers reiterated the view that Western diplomats and other
international observers familiar with Rwanda fully recognized the risks of genocide in the country. See Colum Lynch,
“Exclusive: Rwanda Revisited,” Foreign Policy, 5 April 2015. Available from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/05/rwandarevisited-genocide-united-states-state-department/ (accessed 12 January 2016).
5

Eriksson, John et al. 1996. The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Synthesis
Report. Copenhagen: OECD Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March, 9.
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Patriotic Front (RPF); the second was the disastrous “Blackhawk Down” incident of October 1993,
which had resulted in the deaths of eighteen U.S. Special Forces soldiers in Somalia, provoking fears
among American political leaders concerning the dangers of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa:
There existed an internal predisposition on the part of a number of the key actors to deny
the possibility of genocide because facing the consequences might have required them to
alter their course of action. The mesmerization with the success of Arusha and the failure of
Somalia together cast long shadows and distorted an objective analysis of Rwanda.7

This emphasis on the cognitive biases of international actors is also found in Michael Barnett’s
book Eyewitness to a Genocide, which recounts the story of the internal struggles within the United
Nations about how to respond to the Rwandan genocide. Barnett emphasizes that the bureaucratic
culture of the UN limited the capacity of its officials to perceive events in Rwanda clearly:
Government officials and UN staff came to know Rwanda as members of bureaucracies; the
bureaucratic culture situated and defined their knowledge, informed their goals and desires,
shaped what constituted appropriate and inappropriate behavior, distinguished acceptable
from unacceptable consequences, and helped determine right from wrong.8

During the initial weeks after the outbreak of the genocide, Barnett writes, UN Security Council
officials “were operating under the influence of uncertainty and organizationally scripted
descriptions of the violence as a civil war with unfortunate civilian killings, not a prelude to
genocide.”9
This essay revisits the debate over whether the international response to the Rwandan genocide
was hampered principally by failures of political will, or by failures of comprehension as well. I
address the question of how U.S. government officials analyzed the crisis in Rwanda during the
months leading up to the genocide—and whether there may have been missed opportunities for
effective preventive action that could have averted mass violence.
Although the U.S. government was not the only, nor even the most heavily invested, external
power involved in the Rwanda crisis, it played a key role in shaping international responses to the
events that preceded the genocide. U.S. diplomats actively sought to end the war that had begun in
October 1990 with the invasion of a Tutsi exile army from Uganda, and the U.S. helped broker the
Arusha Accords of August 1993. Even more important, as the only superpower left standing after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. dominated discussions over how to redefine not only its
own foreign policy objectives, but also those of its NATO allies and the United Nations, vis-à-vis
political developments in Africa.
This paper limits its focus to U.S. government policy toward Rwanda before April 6, 1994,
excluding from consideration the question of how U.S. officials responded to the genocide after
it had begun. It draws on declassified U.S. government documents, obtained through Freedom of
Information Act requests by the National Security Archive at the George Washington University,
and on retrospective interviews with key working-level U.S. officials who were involved in
formulating and implementing U.S. policy toward Central Africa from 1990 through the eve of the
genocide in April 1994.
Ibid, 19. See also Suhrke, Astri and Bruce Jones. 2000. “Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda: Failure to Act or Failure of
Actions?” in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post–Cold War World. Edited by Bruce
Jentleson. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 241. “The failure to recognize the transformation of the conflict from civil
war to genocide and to anticipate the escalation in victims and, equally, the failure to possibly nip the genocide in the bud
at two points in time, constitute the most critical missed opportunities of the Rwanda case.”
7

8

Barnett, Michael N. 2002. Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 7.

Ibid, 14. Gregory Brazeal echoes Barnett’s arguments, citing the work of Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow on
bureaucratic decision-making processes: 1999. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edition, New York:
Addison-Wesley, 4-6. According to Brazeal, responses to genocide by the U.S. government “follow standardized routines,
bureaucrats operate according to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ rather than a ‘logic of consequence,’ and seemingly irrational
results often follow when a bureaucracy is confronted with a problem for which it has no preset response.”
9

©2016

Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 3 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.3.1362

Levinger

36

Several key findings emerge from this research. Perhaps most strikingly, I conclude that before
April 1994, virtually no U.S. diplomats or intelligence analysts working on Central Africa anticipated
the scope of the violence that erupted that month. Their worst-case scenarios generally envisioned the
resumption of a war between the Hutu-dominated government and the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic
Front resulting in tens of thousands of deaths—more than an order of magnitude less than the
actual toll of the genocide. This near-universal misperception of the nature and scope of the threat
had fatal consequences for Rwanda’s Tutsi.
Two key factors inhibited the capacity of U.S. government analysts and policymakers to
comprehend and respond to the imminent catastrophe brewing in Rwanda:
•
•

The use of a faulty cognitive frame that failed to differentiate between threats of civil war
and genocide, leading U.S. officials to underestimate the virulence of the threat to Tutsi
civilians.
The adoption of rigid policy guidance stressing the need to achieve a formal power-sharing
agreement for Rwanda—and the continuing insistence on staying this diplomatic course
despite indications that the implementation of the power-sharing arrangement mandated
by the Arusha Accords would exacerbate rather than alleviate the conflicts between rival
factions in Rwanda.

After assessing the impact of these factors on U.S. intelligence analysis and diplomacy toward
Rwanda, the paper examines the policy implications of this case study. It concludes by discussing
the continuing relevance of the lessons of Rwanda for U.S. and international responses to
contemporary threats of genocide and mass atrocities.
Rwanda on the Brink of Genocide, 1990-1993
In October 1993, less than a week after the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers in the Blackhawk Down
incident in Somalia, President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda visited Washington, D.C. to meet
with Secretary of State Warren Christopher and other top U.S. government officials. A report
published in March 1993 by an international commission of inquiry had accused Habyarimana and
his entourage of sponsoring a “deliberate policy” aimed at “inciting Rwandans to hate and attack
each other,” and of permitting extremist militias to “terrorize people in many parts of the country
with no effective reaction from the officials responsible to public security.”10 In August 1993, the
UN Special Rapporteur on Summary, Arbitrary, and Extrajudicial Executions had issued a report
that largely confirmed this commission’s findings, concluding that the UN Genocide Convention
“might … be considered to apply to” the massacres committed over the past three years, which had
claimed the lives of more than 2,000 Tutsi.11
But, in meeting with Habyarimana that October, Secretary Christopher expressed no concerns
about human rights abuses by the Rwandan regime. Instead he applauded the Rwandan president
for his “great courage” in having signed the Arusha Accords of August 1993, which had settled a
three-year war between the Hutu-dominated Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF), an insurgency of expatriate Tutsi who had lived as refugees in Uganda. Christopher
“expressed…satisfaction” with the recent UN Security Council vote to create a Rwanda
peacekeeping mission, and he articulated his hope that the peacekeepers would “be very effective”
in implementing the Accords.12
Report of the International Commission on Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda since October 1, 1990, March 1993. Available from:
https://www.hrw.org/report/1993/03/01/report-international-commission-investigation-human-rights-violations-rwanda
(accessed 14 January 2016).
10

OAU Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities, Ch. 9, p. 64; United Nations Economic and Social
Council, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, “Report by Mr. B. W. Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur, on his mission to Rwanda
from 8 to 17 April 1993,” 11 August 1993, E/CN.4/1994/7/Add. 1, 22-23.
11

U.S. Department of State, cable State 313040, “President Habyarimana and Secretary Christopher Discuss Peace Process
and Challenges Ahead,” 14 October 1993, Rwanda Genocide Collection (compiled 1998-2003), National Security
Archive, Washington, DC, available from: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/Rw27.pdf (accessed
14 January 2016).
12
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Christopher’s optimism reflected the views expressed in other State Department policy papers
and cable traffic from this period. In June 1993, nine months before the outbreak of genocide, a policy
memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose had described “the
reconciliation process” in Rwanda as one of six “realizable goals” for U.S. policy toward Africa in
the coming year. “Real progress has been registered,” the memo declared. “Prospects are good that
Rwanda, a volatile, heavily populated country with a history of extreme ethnic violence, can move
into nation-building during the next year.”13
In late January 1994, the State Department released its annual Country Report on Human
Rights Practices for Rwanda in 1993. The report concluded:
Human rights abuses that plagued the first quarter of 1993 diminished considerably as the
peace process progressed… Those abuses stemmed from dissatisfaction on the part of the
former sole party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), over
the power-sharing arrangement agreed to on January 9 between the multiparty Government
and the RPF.14

As late as 1 April 1994—six days before the genocide erupted in Kigali—the new U.S.
Ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson, sent a reporting cable to Washington expressing cautious
optimism about the political situation in Rwanda, tinged by concern about a possible return to war:
A round of Good Friday calls to observers, the UN and key players suggests that the sides
are inching towards each other, but afraid to make the final offer. Many observers believe
the installation of institutions will have to await the Arusha summit on Burundi…Our major
fear is that the relative calm which has characterized Kigali the last couple of weeks will not
hold until then. I have urged all my interlocutors to use every influence at their disposal to
encourage calm as we approach this last turn on the course.15

The war of 1990-1993 was the outgrowth of a long and bitter polarization of relations between
Rwanda’s majority Hutu and minority Tutsi ethnic groups. In the pre-colonial era, the rulers
had been drawn from the pastoralist Tutsi, rather than the agriculturalist Hutu, but these ethnic
distinctions had been fluid and permeable. Under German colonial rule beginning in the 1880s, and
especially after Belgium seized control of Rwanda after World War I, the distinction between Hutu
and Tutsi became hardened as the Europeans redefined these essentially social categories in racial
terms. German and Belgian colonial administrators relied on Tutsi surrogates to rule Rwanda,
viewing the Tutsi as an aristocratic race with Caucasoid features, and in the 1920s the Belgian
administrators issued racial identity cards that permanently fixed Rwandans’ ethnic identities.
The Hutu emancipation movement of the late 1950s, led by Grégoire Kayibanda, represented
a rebellion against Tutsi social domination as well as Belgian colonial rule. From the onset of the
independence struggle in 1959 through the immediate aftermath of Rwandan independence in
1962, more than 20,000 people died in political violence and 150,000—perhaps half of Rwanda’s
Tutsi population—fled to neighboring countries including Uganda and Burundi.
Neighboring Burundi, whose population had an ethnic composition similar to Rwanda’s—
but where the minority Tutsi ruled the country after independence—also experienced massive
intercommunal violence during this era. In 1972, between 100,000 and 300,000 Burundian Hutu
were massacred, and thousands of Hutu refugees fled to Rwanda. Taking advantage of the ensuing
U.S. Department of State, Information Memorandum from George E. Moose through Mr. Tarnoff to the Secretary,
“The African Agenda During the Next Twelve Months: Realizable Goals and Perceived Pitfalls”, 18 June 1993, Rwanda
Genocide Collection (compiled 1998-2003), National Security Archive, Washington, DC.
13

U.S. Department of State, “Rwanda Human Rights Practices, 1993,” in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
1993, 31 January1994, Rwanda Genocide Collection (compiled 1998-2003), National Security Archive, Washington, DC.
14

U.S. Department of State, cable Kigali 01458, “Negotiations Slide Into Long Weekend,” 1 April 1994, Rwanda Genocide
Collection (compiled 1998-2003), National Security Archive, Washington, DC. Available from: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/Rw02.pdf (accessed 14 January 2016).
15
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chaos, Rwandan army Maj. Gen. Juvenal Habyarimana, a Belgian-trained paratrooper from
Northern Rwanda, overthrew President Kayibanda (who had favored the interests of Southern
Hutus) in 1973. For the next eighteen years, Habyarimana presided over a stable, autocratic, and
increasingly ossified regime in which a Northern Hutu elite maintained its monopoly on power.16
In 1990, this regime began to unravel. Under pressure from France and other Western aid
donors, Habyarimana announced a program of political reforms in July 1990. These reforms
included the transition to a multi-party system by 1992, a referendum on a national political charter
by June 1991, the end of compulsory membership in his National Revolutionary Movement for
Development (MRND) party, the end of ethnic identification on national identity cards, and the
peaceful return of refugees. The issue of refugee return was particularly problematic. By 1990,
more than 400,000 Rwandan Tutsi refugees were living in Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania, and
the host governments were placing increasing pressure on these refugee communities. But as the
most densely populated country in Africa, Rwanda was ill-equipped to absorb a large influx of
repatriated refugees, especially in light of the economic hardship caused by the economic austerity
program imposed on Rwanda by the International Monetary Fund and by the collapse of global
commodity prices during the early 1990s. Habyarimana’s democratization program extended no
political rights to Rwandan Tutsi living as refugees outside the country’s borders.
On 1 October 1990, approximately 2,000 Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels, mainly Rwandan
Tutsi refugees serving in Uganda’s National Resistance Army, invaded northeast Rwanda from
Uganda. With French and Belgian military assistance, Rwandan government forces halted the initial
RPF assault. But the U.S. and other donor governments recognized the intractable nature of the
conflict and pressed Habyarimana toward negotiations to reach a power-sharing agreement. In the
summer of 1991, Habyarimana set forth a new constitution in order to effect political reforms, the
national assembly passed a law allowing the formation of political parties, and shortly thereafter
five parties registered with the government and began meetings and demonstrations. In early 1992,
hard-line members of the president’s party founded a Hutu-supremacist party, the Coalition for
the Defense of the Republic (CDR), which began lobbying for inclusion in the government. Under
pressure from Western donors, in April 1992 Habyarimana named a prime minister from the MDR,
the primary opposition party, who then formed a five-party coalition government that limited
Habyarimana’s power over routine governmental affairs.
In peace talks hosted by Tanzania and attended by American, French, and other international
representatives, the transitional government concluded several protocols with RPF representatives
collectively known as the Arusha Accords, which were signed by Habyarimana and RPF Chairman
Alexis Kanyarengwe in August 1993. The Accords stipulated the establishment of a 22-month broadbased transitional government (BBTG) within 37 days; elections by the end of 1995; the return of
exiles, refugees and displaced persons; the integration of FAR and RPF forces; the integration and
reduction of the Presidential Guard and other elite forces; and a Neutral International Force (NIF)
to maintain peace. But African leaders witnessing the signing were skeptical about the viability
of the agreement, and there was no celebration in Kigali. Almost immediately, the Accords’
transition process deadlocked, as the various players presented slates of ministerial candidates
and maneuvered for position and influence.17
Even as the rival factions in Rwanda jockeyed for advantage, the member states of the
UN Security Council in New York locked horns over the establishment of the NIF. The Arusha
Accords had stipulated that the NIF would carry out a wide range of security tasks, including
guaranteeing the overall security of the country, maintaining law and order, tracking arms caches
and neutralizing armed gangs throughout the country, and determining security parameters for
Kigali with the objective of making it a neutral zone. Under pressure from the U.S. and other
member states, the Security Council scaled back both the size and the mandate of the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), authorizing a force of 2,548 peacekeepers
charged with the responsibilities to “contribute to the security of the city of Kigali inter alia within
OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, Ch. 8, “The Arusha Peace Process,”
15-33.
16

17

Ibid, 34-53; Suhrke and Jones, “Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda.”
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a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city,” to “monitor observance
of the cease-fire agreement,” and to “monitor the security situation during the final period of the
transitional government’s mandate, leading up to the elections.”18
In October 1993, before the broad-based transitional government could be established in
Rwanda, neighboring Burundi’s first elected Hutu president was assassinated by Tutsi military
officers. The subsequent two months witnessed a massive bloodletting in which 30,000 to 50,000
Burundian Hutu and Tutsi died in intercommunal violence and 250,000 refugees fled the country.
The massacres in Burundi eviscerated what little trust and good will remained between rival Hutu
and Tutsi political factions in Rwanda, dealing a fatal blow to the already shaky prospects for the
implementation of the Arusha Accords.
The Limits of Foreknowledge: U.S. Conflict Analysis on the Eve of Genocide
Proponents of the view that U.S. officials surely must have known about the impending genocide
have ample ammunition to support their claims. Various diplomats and other international
observers had urgently warned of the threat of violence in Rwanda. Canadian law professor
Professor William Schabas, a member of the International Commission of Inquiry that visited
Rwanda in January 1993, describes the political climate that he and the other members of the
Commission encountered:
[F]aced with convincing evidence of mass killings (i.e., tens to hundreds at a time) of Tutsis,
accompanied by public incitement whose source could be traced to the highest levels of the
ruling oligarchy, the word “genocide” sprang inexorably to our lips. . . . In a press release
issued the day after our departure from Rwanda, we spoke of genocide and warned of the
abyss into which the country was heading.19

On 11 January 1994, three months before the genocide erupted, the Force Commander of the UN
Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), Maj. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, faxed UN headquarters in New York
to relay information from an informant who worked as a trainer for the President’s party militia.
After providing details of the militia’s direct connections to the President’s party and the Rwandan
Army, Dallaire’s informant reported: “Since UNAMIR mandate he has been ordered to register all
Tutsi in Kigali. He suspects it is for their extermination. Example he gave was that in 20 minutes his
personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis.”20
The following month, Dallaire reported that time was “running out for political discussions”
and “any spark on the security side could possibly have catastrophic consequences.”21 Following
the assassination of two leading government officials in late February, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh,
the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Rwanda, declared that the “general
situation is observed to be explosive.”22 In a letter to the UN Security Council, the Belgian Foreign
Ministry urged that the peacekeeping force in Rwanda be reinforced. It warned, “The political
assassinations, the ensuing unrest, and the worsening of the climate of safety, could well lead to
Hilaire, Max. 2015. Waging Peace: The United Nations Security Council and Transnational Armed Conflicts. Berlin: Logos
Verlag, 70-72; UN Security Council Resolution 872, October 5, 1993. Available from: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB452/docs/doc01.pdf (accessed 14 January 2016).
18

19
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a new bloodbath,” and expressed concern that the Belgian peacekeepers could become “passive
witnesses to genocide in Rwanda.”23
But most U.S. government diplomatic reporting and intelligence analysis on Rwanda lacked
this sense of urgency. Although a few analysts issued warnings about the potential for mass
atrocities, virtually none of the Central Africa experts in the U.S. government anticipated the scope
of the impending violence. For example, David Rawson, who became U.S. ambassador to Rwanda
in January 1994, had grown up in Burundi as the son of a missionary and was one of the only
speakers of Kinyarwanda in the U.S. government. Though Rawson “expected internecine killing,
he did not anticipate the scale at which it occurred. ‘Nothing in Rwandan culture or history could
have led a person to that forecast,’ he says. ‘Most of us thought that if a war broke out, it would be
quick, that these poor people didn’t have the resources, the means, to fight a sophisticated war. I
couldn’t have known that they would do each other in with the most economic means.’”24 George
Moose, then serving as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, echoes this view: “We were
psychologically and imaginatively too limited.”25
For officials at the highest echelons of the U.S. government, the degree of awareness of the
situation in Rwanda was far lower. Madeleine Albright, who was the U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations, recalls:
There had been killings in Somalia, Bosnia; just constant attention to a lot of other issues,
unfortunately. We did know obviously that there were struggles both in Rwanda and Burundi.
There was hope that the Arusha accords would actually have resolved some of the long-term
fighting between the Hutus and Tutsis, so I think it was not high on the agenda…. It didn’t
show up very often in intelligence summaries. There were not very frequent reports about it.26

According to Anthony Lake, President Clinton’s National Security Adviser from 1993 to 1997,
“[T]here was very little attention to what the problem was and how to fix it politically . . . at least
at my level.” Several days after the genocide erupted on 6 April 1994, Lake attended a meeting at
the Pentagon to plan the evacuation of American civilians from Rwanda. At the end of the meeting,
he says, “I asked some of the people from the Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘So what’s going on?
Who’s killing who? I haven’t seen much about this.’ Maybe I’d seen something, but hadn’t certainly
focused on it. And they couldn’t tell me.”27 Likewise, Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, who was
then serving as Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the Department of Defense, “frantically
telephoned around the Pentagon for insight into the ethnic dimensions of events in Rwanda” in
early April. Clark remembers staff officers asking: “Is it Hutu and Tutsi or Tutu and Hutsi?”28
To evaluate the quality of U.S. intelligence analysis and diplomatic reporting on Rwanda
during the months leading up to the genocide, one must first make clear one’s premises about the
nature and purpose of conflict analysis and early warning. Many laypeople conceive of intelligence
analysis as a kind of crystal ball whose value depends on how accurately it predicts future events.
For example, several publications on the Rwanda genocide have asserted that, in early 1994, a CIA
analyst predicted that as many as 500,000 people might die there in genocidal violence.29 They
present this claim as proof that the U.S. government knew that genocide was imminent in Rwanda,
and that it should have taken more robust preventive action.
Belgian Foreign Ministry, Telex #64, From MINAFET to DELBELONU, 25 February 1994. Available from:
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1015806-19940225-gob-bsrr-translation.html#document/p1/a144308
(accessed 14 January 2016).
23

24

Quoted in Power A Problem From Hell, 347-48.

25

Ibid, 348.

Albright, Madeleine. Interview for PBS Frontline documentary, “Ghosts of Rwanda,” 25 February 2004. Available from:
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But this line of argumentation presents two difficulties. First, the intelligence report that
allegedly predicted half a million deaths may well be apocryphal. Three senior U.S. government
analysts—two from the CIA and one from the State Department—who have searched the CIA’s
classified records have been unable to locate any such document. Nor does such a document appear
in the collection of nearly 4,500 declassified U.S. and Canadian diplomatic cables and intelligence
reports from between 1990 and 1994 concerning Rwanda that have been obtained by the National
Security Archive, an independent institute at the George Washington University,30 or in a more
recent tranche of declassified documents published by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in
2014.31
The second, more fundamental difficulty with the claim that the CIA predicted the Rwandan
genocide lies in the very assumption that intelligence analysis should have the capacity to accurately
predict future events. Nassim Taleb, a statistician who studies business risks, points out that there
are inherent limitations to humans’ capacity to anticipate future catastrophic events. Taleb uses
the term “Black Swan” to describe a “random event satisfying the following three properties: large
impact, incomputable probabilities, and surprise effect.” Because a Black Swan represents a sudden
and massive deviation from a normative state “with nothing in the past history of the process . . .
indicating such possibility,” it cannot be reliably predicted. Moreover:
By some vicious dialectic, it is the surprise element that either causes the Black Swan or at
least exacerbates its consequences. If there were anything [in past experience] convincing
about the need for protection, then agents would have taken preventive or protective actions.
These would have either stopped it in its tracks or limited its impact.32

One of the most sophisticated Central Africa analysts in the U.S. government in 1994 worked
in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. An expert on the political dynamics
of Rwanda and Burundi, he had a Ph.D. in Conflict Resolution had done extensive research on
peace processes in Africa. In his view, the Rwandan genocide meets Taleb’s criteria for the Black
Swan: “I don’t think normal analysis can account for a ‘perfect storm.’ I still think that if you put
good analysts in a room and gave them the pre-94 data they would not come up with genocide on
that scale.”33
Indeed, recent historical research by historians including André Guichaoua, as well as findings
by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), suggests that the genocide may not
have been fully planned in advance. Rather, the violence escalated rapidly in April 1994 as a result
of evolving circumstances on the ground and decisions made by key actors in the conflict.34
Although it may have been impossible before April 1994 to predict the magnitude of the
impending violence in Rwanda, ample evidence existed regarding the ominous nature of the
conflict. One curious aspect of international reporting on Rwandan politics during this period
is that, in several cases, observers with relatively little personal knowledge of Central Africa
recognized the threat of genocide more clearly than seasoned Africa hands in the U.S. government,
the United Nations, and other organizations. In 1993, both the International Commission of Inquiry
on Violations of Human Rights in Rwanda and B. W. Ndiaye, the UN Special Rapporteur, described
the conflict as a potential genocide—though neither predicted the magnitude of the killing. In
30
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January 1994, the newly arrived UN force commander in Rwanda, Gen. Dallaire, also warned of
the potential for catastrophic violence against Rwandan Tutsis.
U.S. diplomats and analysts witnessed the same danger signs as these other observers but
frequently discounted their significance. Ambassador Joyce Leader, who was Deputy Chief of
Mission in Embassy Kigali from 1991 to 1994, recalls a series of worrisome events of late 1992 and
early 1993:
•

•
•

•

The infamous speech of 22 November 1992 by Leon Mugesera, an MRND official in the
Northwestern Gisenyi Prefecture (Pres. Habyarimana’s home district), denouncing the
opposition parties as traitors, condoning summary justice against them, and declaring that
the “Tutsi should return to Ethiopia from whence they came … via the Nyaborongo River”
(implying that they should be murdered and their bodies thrown into the river). According
to Amb. Leader, Mugesera’s message “spread by word of mouth like wildfire throughout
the country,” and that subsequently, Tutsi employees of the American embassy “were
falling asleep at their desks, unable to do their work,” because the men were standing
guard at night to protect their families from attack.
A speech by a local official in Gisenyi Prefecture in late December 1992 warning of
imminent RPF attacks and advising listeners to “clear the brush” in the forest—i.e. kill
Tutsi villagers—“so the RPF would have nowhere to hide.”
The massacres of at least 300 Tutsi in Gisenyi Prefecture in December 1992 and January
1993, which, “though portrayed as spontaneous, … stopped abruptly during a two to
three week period in January when an International Commission on Human Rights was
in Rwanda.”
“Daily reports … about deaths and destruction across northern Rwanda.”35

Yet the Embassy staff made little systematic effort to investigate these incidents. Joyce Leader
recalls: “[W]e knew about the formation and the training of the militia, but we didn’t do anything
about it, except to talk to people and say that this is unconscionable—you can’t do this.”36 Indeed,
diplomatic cables from Embassy Kigali sometimes minimized the significance of the violence in
Rwanda. For example, on 16 December 1992, the State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs transmitted a draft of the 1992 Country Report on Human Rights Practices
for Rwanda to Embassy Kigali. The report charged: “In 1992 there were significant human rights
abuses, many related to the conflict with the RPF,” and that: “Credible reports allege that local
officials were involved in widespread ethnic violence in March in which 300 died and 15,000 were
displaced.”37 A week later, Embassy Kigali cabled back to protest these allegations:
We contest the claim of “significant human rights abuses.” War, ethnic violence, political
violence, terrorism and unchecked assaults are abominations and cause immense
human suffering. Can they, however, be classified as human rights abuses when their
links to government actions or agents are tenuous, unproven and, indeed, seem to be
perpetrated by all sides and not necessarily orchestrated or organized? In Rwanda, all
sides are suspect but conclusive evidence is either lacking or ambiguous. We propose:
In 1992 there were human rights abuses in Rwanda, many related to the conflict with the
RPF.38
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As for the reports published by the International Commission of Inquiry in March 1993 and
by the UN Special Rapporteur that August, Embassy Kigali noted duly their assertions, but did
not share their sense of alarm. Indeed, the first draft of the Embassy’s 1993 Human Rights Country
Report for Rwanda, composed that October, asserted: “The peace process that culminated in the
August 4 peace accord led to the virtual elimination of the human rights abuses that plagued the
country during the first quarter of 1993.”39 Commenting on a subsequent draft of the Human Rights
Report two months later, Embassy Kigali declared of the International Commission of Inquiry:
The group’s findings were welcomed by the human rights groups in Rwanda that believe
the president and his party are behind all abuses; they documented long-held suspicions.
However, the human rights groups that defend Hutus criticized the Commission’s work.
The Commission’s methodology had several weaknesses.40

The Embassy did not elaborate on the nature of the weaknesses it perceived in the Commission’s
report.
During the eighteen months before the genocide, analysts at both the State Department and
the Defense Intelligence Agency issued occasional warnings of the potential for mass atrocities in
Rwanda. Already in September 1992, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR) issued a classified report with the chillingly prescient subtitle “The Hutu Right and the
Genocide Card.” This report pointed out that, historically, when exiled Tutsi had launched crossborder attacks aimed at toppling the Hutu-dominated government, “The Kigali regime—or
certainly key elements within it—reacted by killing Tutsis living inside Rwanda.”41 In February
1993, following the Gisenyi massacres and the subsequent resumption of the RPF offensive in
Northern Rwanda, the DIA Weekly Warning Forecast Summary declared: “Renewed warfare
could lead to the RPF and government forces participating in ‘ethnic cleansing’ of their opponents
further exacerbating the situation.”42
Despite having invoked the term genocide, the author of the State Department report says that
he did not imagine the possibility of the full-scale destruction of Rwanda’s Tutsi population:
I was certainly aware of the possibility of something like that happening, of genocidal type
killing going on. The thing that I didn’t get was the scale of this thing. I think I explicitly
said, “Oh you could have like twenty thousand people killed, as occurred in the early sixties,
twenty thousand people.” It’s sort of like, magnify that by ten times or twenty times, or forty
times! That took a leap of imagination I just didn’t have.43

But the majority of U.S. intelligence reporting and diplomatic cables on Rwanda before
April 1994 failed to differentiate between the threat of war and genocide. Typical of such
reports was the CIA’s classified Africa Review of 14 January 1994, which included an item on
Rwanda under the heading: “Sub-Saharan Africa: Democratization Chronology.” Circulated
three days after Gen. Dallaire’s alarming fax to UN headquarters about the arms caches in Kigali,
this report included no mention of the Dallaire fax (which none of our interviewees reports ever
having seen before the genocide), but two brief paragraphs about the renewed mandate of the
UN peacekeeping mission to Rwanda and one paragraph on delays in the implementation of the
Arusha Accords:
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Political bickering … indefinitely postpones the swearing in of a broad-based transitional
cabinet and national assembly as called for by the August 1993 settlement agreement that
ended 34 months of fighting between the ethnic Hutu-majority based regime and opposing
Tutsi rebels. Any prolonged impasse risks a breakdown of the country’s cease-fire.44

Apart from the reference to political bickering, which indicates incuriosity about the pre-genocidal
conditions in Rwanda, this report was striking for the implicit plot line that it put forth. The report
suggested that the democratization process in Rwanda had the potential to move either forwards
or backwards—but it did not entertain the possibility that political events might veer off in an
entirely different and more sinister direction.
The most explicit warning of the possibility of imminent violence came in a CIA report
included in the highly classified National Intelligence Daily of 19 March 1994, less than three weeks
before the genocide began. But this paragraph-long warning also focused on the risk of renewed
civil war rather than genocide. Under the heading “Rwanda: Threat of Violence Increasing,” the
paragraph read:
Security is deteriorating in Kigali and in the demilitarized zone between Hutu-dominated
government troops and Tutsi rebel forces. Rumors of imminent warfare are sweeping the
capital, international relief workers report both sides are fortifying defensive positions in
the demilitarized zone, and a nearby American-owned tea factory may close temporarily,
according to the US Embassy. Unless President Habyarimana quickly begins a goodfaith effort to form the multiethnic government he agreed to, the rebels probably will
resume fighting.45

Nor did the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research warn of mass atrocities
against civilians—though, during the months leading up to the genocide, it issued increasingly
urgent warnings of the risk of a renewed war between the Rwandan government and the Tutsi
expatriate army. In December 1993, two months after the assassination of Burundi’s first Hutu
president, Melchior Ndadaye, INR distributed another classified assessment entitled “Burundi:
The Sum of All Fears.” This assessment reported that, since October, “Tens of thousands—no
one knows exactly how many; estimates range from 30,000 to 150,000—have been killed [and] …
700,000 persons … have fled Burundi.” Yet the concluding section of this report, entitled “Rwandan
spillover,” made no reference to the possibility that Rwanda might soon experience violence far
exceeding the scope of the bloodshed in Burundi. It declared of Rwanda:
Leaders of the key parties—perhaps reassured by the presence of 800 Belgian and Bangladeshi
peacekeepers in the capital, and exhausted from a three-year war that neither the RPF
nor government could win—still seem committed to power-sharing. But fear, instability,
and disorganization exacerbated by events in Burundi may further delay or derail the
establishment of a transition government originally slated to take power in September.46

According to the author of this INR report, U.S. diplomats “were paying so much attention to the
peace process, and trying to keep it on the rails, trying to get that transitional government going
that [the Embassy] didn’t really appreciate the possibility of things going completely south.”47
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The Perils of Powersharing: U.S. Diplomatic Strategy, 1990-1994
Peace processes are great. Peace processes sometimes bring peace, and that’s wonderful. But
peace processes, especially at the U.N. and especially within the State Department, can also
be a way of saying we’re doing something even when you had, at a minimum, a nagging
voice telling you that maybe this ain’t working and you have harder decisions to make.
—Anthony Lake, U.S. National Security Advisor, 1993-199748

“We were naïve policy optimists, I suppose,” says Ambassador David Rawson of the attitude
of the U.S. diplomatic corps toward Rwanda during the months leading up to the genocide:
The fact that negotiations can’t work is almost not one of the options open to people who
care about peace. We were looking for the hopeful signs, not the dark signs…. One of the
things I learned and should have already known is that once you launch a process, it takes
on its own momentum. I had said, “Let’s try this, and then if it doesn’t work, we can back
away.” But bureaucracies don’t allow that. Once the Washington side buys into a process, it
gets pursued, almost blindly.49

The Rwanda analyst in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research echoes Rawson’s
view:
I would say the Arusha Agreement, to which we were so committed, was deeply flawed
in ways we were probably not willing to admit, because… it was all we had, so we had
to make it work…. We had gone down this path to such an extent that… to go back to the
international community that had helped forge the peace accord and say, “Well, we better
start over again,” was just not in the cards.50

This commitment to the Arusha process at any price reflected the broader priorities of U.S.
foreign policy on Africa in the aftermath of the Cold War. Following the Soviet Union’s collapse
in the early 1990s, U.S. policymakers had adopted “conflict resolution and democratization” as
the watchwords of their diplomacy toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Operating under the premise that
democratic societies were intrinsically stable and peaceful, policymakers devised a one-size-fits-all
approach to ending violent conflict: convening peace negotiations to produce democratic powersharing agreements, whose implementation should ipso facto result in peace.
This new foreign policy paradigm was summarized by National Security Directive (NSD) 75
on “American Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s,” which President George H. W.
Bush approved in December 1992, and which remained in force during the first years of the Clinton
administration. The policy prescriptions set forth in NSD 75 reflected widely shared assumptions
of the U.S. foreign policy establishment during the early 1990s: “Post-colonial, authoritarian
regimes in Africa have been dismal failures. As they disappear, we have a historical opportunity
to show Africans how stability and development can be achieved through participatory political
life and responsible government.” By propagating “democratic values,” the “rule of law,” and
“free and fair elections,” U.S.-sponsored programs could “help make democratic experiments in
Africa permanent realities” and thus promote the primary U.S. objectives of “conflict resolution
and political stability” in Sub-Saharan Africa.51
Despite the lofty rhetoric, the Arusha Accords were a profoundly flawed foundation for
stable peace in Rwanda. Astri Suhrke and Bruce Jones describe the Arusha Accords as a “victor’s
agreement”—or, in the words of Belgian scholar Filip Reyntjens at the time of the signing—“a
48
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veritable coup d’état for the RPF and the internal opposition.”52 The RPF had routed the Rwandan
government’s military forces in its February 1993 offensive, and France’s military support for the
Habyarimana regime had played a critical role in halting the RPF’s initial advance toward Kigali.
Moreover, the RPF fielded a highly focused and disciplined team of negotiators to the Arusha
negotiations of 1992-1993, whereas the government’s negotiating team was fractured between
Habyarimana’s MRND party and three opposition parties. Foreign Minister Boniface Ngulinzira,
a member of the opposition MDR, headed the government’s negotiating team. On the RPF’s
insistence, the Hutu extremist Coalition for Defense of the Republic (CDR) was excluded from the
negotiating table—but CDR observers attended the Arusha talks and worked to undermine any
potential agreement.53
Another factor weakening the position of the Rwandan government vis-à-vis the RPF
reflected a structural feature of the Arusha negotiations. As INR had emphasized in a classified
“African Trends” report issued on 18 September 1992 (nearly a year before the signing of the
Arusha Accords):
Habyarimana’s side has been pushed harder and more successfully to compromise. The
government is vulnerable to military pressure from the RPF and to political and economic
pressure from major western donors. The RPF leadership by contrast enjoys sanctuary in
Uganda and is not so heavily pressed by Kigali, outsiders, or the costs of a war which is
fought on Rwandan soil. It is likely, therefore, that the RPF will maintain a more intransigent
negotiating position. This would perpetuate the current instability and stir passions that
could lead to the sort of anti-Tutsi genocide that gripped Rwanda and neighboring Burundi
in the past.54

This report warned of “the possibility of a genocidal civil war” if the ongoing talks in Arusha were
to fail:
Whether the parties reach agreement depends partly on how much power President
Habyarimana is willing to cede to the RPF and domestic opposition parties. But to be
accepted by Kigali (and viewed as legitimate by the Rwandan people), a true settlement also
depends on the RPF’s willingness to accept a powersharing formula more in accordance
with the Tutsis’ 10-15 percent of the population than with the 50-50 share the RPF has been
demanding.

As a result of these imbalances at the Arusha talks, the final peace agreement was highly
unfavorable to Habyarimana’s MRND party, which was granted only five of twenty-one cabinet
positions in the prospective 22-month Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG). The
agreement was even less appealing to the extremist CDR, which was excluded from the government
altogether. Adding insult to injury, the RPF was given the right to provide 40 percent of the soldiers
in the new Rwandan army, and 50 percent of the officer corps, far above the Tutsis’ proportion of
the country’s population.55
Suhrke and Jones observe: “While resembling a victor’s agreement, the accords left the losing
side with access to the state apparatus in an interim period, and hence the means for obstructing the
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implementation of a political order that was decidedly unfavorable to its interests.”56 Both during
the negotiations and in the implementation phase, Habyarimana made no secret of his distaste
for the accords. He refused to sign any of the preliminary agreements before the final ceremony
in Arusha in August 1993, and he repeatedly disavowed proposals that had been accepted by the
government’s own negotiating team.57 In November 1992, Habyarimana announced in a public
speech that the agreement on political power-sharing was “nothing but a scrap of paper…that the
government is not obliged to respect.”58 Several months later, at the 1993 annual conference of the
MRND, he pledged to resist any sharing of power with the RPF.59
Beyond these general concerns about the political marginalization of the MRND and the
CDR’s exclusion from power, the Arusha Accords also sparked fears among Rwandan Hutus about
their economic well-being and even their physical survival. UN Special Rapporteur B. W. Ndiaye
pointed to one of these concerns in his report of August 1993:
Many of the people to whom the Special Rapporteur spoke pointed out that the return of
the 400,000 to 500,000 refugees from abroad would cause a number of problems. Firstly,
as has been mentioned, Rwanda is the most densely populated country in Africa and
there has long since been no land to spare. In addition to this, certain Hutu businessmen
are afraid that the Tutsi who have made their fortune in the countries receiving them
are coming back to resume control of the Rwandese economy, thereby reasserting their
domination.60

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, who oversaw U.S. policy at
the outset of the Arusha talks in 1992, had identified the refugee problem as a key obstacle to a
peace settlement, and advocated addressing it as a primary issue for negotiation.61 But while the
final agreement of 1993 guaranteed the right of return for Tutsi refugees, it provided no formal
safeguards for the rights of those already residing in Rwanda, apart from the stipulation that
“refugees who left the country more than 10 years ago should not reclaim their properties, which
might have been occupied by other people.”62
Another possible cause for concern for the Hutu elites was the loss of the safety net provided
by the French military forces in Rwanda, which had intervened three times to protect the regime
from the RPF. In January 1993, French Ambassador Georges Martre, who had long been a staunch
advocate for the Habyarimana regime, ended his tour of duty in Kigali.63 The Arusha Accords
mandated that all French military forces leave Rwanda as a precondition for the power-sharing
agreement. Their departure in December 1993 deprived Rwandan Hutus of this implicit security
guarantee, leaving in place only a weak UN contingent that had neither the mandate nor the
capacity for a robust peace enforcement mission.
By far the most damaging blow to the confidence of Rwanda’s Hutu leaders was the mass killing
that erupted in neighboring Burundi in October 1993, following the assassination of the newly
elected Hutu president of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye. In the words of the State Department’s
Rwanda analyst:
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I think one of the reasons the Rwandan Hutus signed onto Arusha in August was because
they felt like they could relax a little bit, because the Tutsis had peacefully surrendered
power in [Burundi in] June/July. So the Burundi transition may have contributed to a slight
mellowing on the Hutu side. It seemed to be, “okay, this isn’t so bad, maybe things are
changing, so maybe we can handle this power sharing government.” But then the army
comes in and assassinates the president and plunges the country into this violent spiral.
Rwandans look at that and just think, “Holy Christ, look what’s going on down there?”…
[M]oderates were turned into hard-liners, and hardliners were turned into génocidaires, and
it was… the only good Tutsi is a dead Tutsi. I don’t know if Arusha would have worked
under any circumstances, but it became much, much, much more difficult after Burundi
went down.64

Despite all of these ominous signs, U.S. diplomats continued to view the full and timely
implementation of the Arusha Accords as the only viable path to sustainable peace in Rwanda.
Joyce Leader, who was the Deputy Chief of Mission at Embassy Kigali, writes that she and other
diplomats “assumed, mistakenly as it turned out, that the parties had agreed to … implement
and abide by the agreements reached” and “treat the other side as a legitimate partner.” Western
diplomatic interventions reinforced the conflict cycle: “The more the violence escalated, the harder
we diplomats pushed for implementation of the Arusha Accord.”65
During the months leading up to the genocide, only one “Plan B” for Rwanda was seriously
discussed by senior U.S. and UN policymakers: namely, “pulling the plug” on UNAMIR and
withdrawing the peacekeeping force if the Rwandans failed to establish the transitional government
in a timely manner.66 Ambassador Donald Steinberg, who was then serving as White House deputy
press secretary, points out the fallacy behind this threat. Steinberg observes that telling the parties to
the conflict “that if they were being intransigent, we could remove the international peacekeepers”
was “the equivalent of saying if there is a babysitter and the kids are misbehaving, the alternative
is to have the babysitter leave, and then they burn down the house.”67
Policy Implications for Genocide Prevention
In a 2006 interview, former President Bill Clinton recalled his own response toward the Rwanda
genocide as it was unfolding: “We never even had a staff meeting on it. But I don’t blame anybody
that works for me. That was my fault. I should have been alert and alive to it.”68 In seeking to
account for the passivity of senior U.S. officials toward the Rwanda genocide, most commentators
have pointed to the lack of “political will” for a more robust response. Samantha Power has argued:
It is in the realm of domestic politics that the battle to stop genocide is lost. American political
leaders interpret society-wide silence as an indicator of public indifference. They reason that
they will incur no costs if the United States remains uninvolved but will face steep risks if
they engage. Potential sources of influence—lawmakers on Capitol Hill, editorial boards,
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non-governmental groups, and ordinary constituents—do not generate political pressure
sufficient to change the calculus of America’s leaders.69

Although Power makes a persuasive case, it is important to recognize that genocide cannot
be prevented merely by building the political will to do so. In any genocidal situation, popular
demands by the American public for humanitarian intervention are likely to arise—if at all—only
after mass atrocities have begun, by which time tens or hundreds of thousands of people may
already have been killed. And by this stage of the crisis, many low-cost, non-military options
for intervention may have evaporated, forcing policymakers to resort to risky and costly peace
enforcement missions in order to suppress genocidal violence. From this perspective, it appears
that the most important question is not how to generate the political will to respond to genocide
when it occurs, but rather how to create the diplomatic capacity to prevent genocide before it begins.
Information Collection and Analysis
Three principal deficiencies in information collection and analysis hampered U.S. officials’
efforts to understand the emerging crisis in Rwanda: (1) the lack of early warning mechanisms
for conveying relevant information to high-level U.S. policymakers; (2) inadequate information
gathering concerning the conflict; and (3) the distorted framing of the conflict as a civil war rather
than as a potential genocide.
Lack of early warning mechanisms. Events in Central Africa rarely attracted the attention of
U.S. policymakers above the level of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Even within the
State Department’s Africa Bureau, the attention of senior officials was split in numerous directions.
Amb. Prudence Bushnell, who was serving as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, recalls: “I was responsible …for promoting democracy in 48 countries, resolving
conflict in all these countries. It included environment, HIV/AIDS—I mean what a perfectly
ridiculous portfolio to have.”70 The State Department and intelligence agencies did not have any
systematic mechanism for calling the attention of senior officials at the White House and National
Security Council to emerging threats of genocide.
Inadequate information gathering. Embassy Kigali was a small overseas post with a staff
of only four U.S. nationals including the ambassador. It had no political officer, CIA station, or
military attaché, which meant that the ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission were the primary
“eyes and ears” for the mission. Embassy staff cultivated only limited local contacts apart from
Rwandan government officials, diplomats from other embassies in Kigali, and foreign nationals
working for the U.S. mission. They did not consistently investigate incidents of violence or rumors
of treaty violations. Nor did they systematically track or report on “hate radio” broadcasts or
speeches by prominent political figures inciting intercommunal violence. Joyce Leader recalls: “I
think the formation of the militia was something we knew about, but we just never got out and
tried to track it down. We went on what we gathered from other people without any firsthand
information. When we would confront people in positions of authority, which we did, they would
of course deny that any such militarization was going on.”71
Both in Kigali and in Washington, diplomats and intelligence analysts either lacked access to
or gave insufficient credence to explicit warnings of potential mass violence. For example, none of
our interviewees reported having seen Gen. Dallaire’s fax to UN headquarters of 11 January 1994,
which warned of the existence of arms caches in Kigali and of Hutu extremists’ plans to exterminate
the Tutsi. As for the warnings of impending violence issued by Rwandan and international human
rights organizations, U.S. diplomats tended to discount these reports, at least partially, as lacking
in objectivity and methodological rigor.
Distorted framing of the conflict. The premise that the establishment of democratic institutions
was the sole viable path to sustainable peace in Sub-Saharan Africa exerted a powerful influence
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over U.S. diplomats’ and intelligence analysts’ reporting on Rwanda. In Joyce Leader’s words, “The
embassy was of the view that a lot of the violence that was going on in the country [was] random
violence. We were of the view that this could be brought under control, if the peace process could
be carried [out], concluded, and then implemented.”72 Perhaps these episodes of violence appeared
“random” because they did not fit observers’ expectations for an emerging democracy. Viewed
as warning signs of a potential genocide, these same acts of violence might not have appeared
random at all.
In an incisive analysis of the UN response to the Rwandan genocide, Michael Barnett observes:
“Before policymakers can act, they must come to create a definition and understanding of the
situation, and that understanding is mediated by how the institution is organized to think.”73 This
paper has shown that U.S. foreign policy institutions were not organized to think systematically
about the threat of genocide in Rwanda during the early 1990s, and that this deficiency inhibited
diplomats’ capacity to take effective preventive action. Despite urgent warnings of impending
communal violence, U.S. diplomats and intelligence analysts focused principally on the risk of a
return to conflict in Rwanda, not on the threat of genocide. Before April 1994, most U.S. intelligence
analysts’ worst-case scenarios for Rwanda envisioned a potential death toll of tens of thousands,
rather than a million. This faulty conflict analysis shaped U.S. policy deliberations, which, in
syllogistic fashion, posited “democratization and conflict resolution” as the sole viable path to
peace in Rwanda. U.S. policymakers discounted the possibility that the Arusha Accords might
aggravate rather than resolve communal tensions in Rwanda, and U.S. officials did not develop any
contingency plans for alternative policy options in the event that the power-sharing arrangements
mandated by the Accords were to collapse.
To be fair, one must acknowledge that U.S. government and other international observers
confronted an exceptionally difficult analytical task during the months leading up to the Rwandan
genocide, as well as during the first few weeks after its eruption. In early 1994, there existed a genuine
risk of renewed conflict in Rwanda. The downing of the presidential jet on April 6 unleashed three
simultaneous catastrophes in the country: a military coup, a civil war, and a genocide. U.S. analysts
and policymakers struggled to make sense of these chaotic events.74 It is perhaps understandable
that, both before and immediately after the outbreak of the genocide, outside observers focused their
attention principally on the threat of war. And yet, the failure of American and other international
leaders to recognize and respond to the prospect of mass violence against civilians in Rwanda gave
an implicit green light to the génocidaires, and may have contributed to expanding the scope of the
violence and accelerating its pace.
Policy Formation and Implementation
At the operational level, the U.S. government was served by a conscientious and capable—though
frequently overwhelmed—group of diplomats who implemented its policy toward Rwanda during
the three years leading up to the 1994 genocide. The central failure of U.S. diplomacy toward
Rwanda during this period stemmed not from the deficiencies of individual diplomats, but rather
from the overarching U.S. strategy for conflict resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa. This strategy, as
outlined in National Security Directive 75 of 1992, emphasized the adoption and implementation of
formal peace agreements and power-sharing arrangements, rather than an incremental approach
toward achieving security and mutual trust among competing factions in order to prepare the
ground for a stable democratic government.
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The U.S. government’s policy guidance toward Rwanda offered essentially only two
alternatives: “Arusha or bust.” Given these constraints, the failure to successfully implement
the Arusha Accords would have left U.S. diplomats entirely without options for productive
engagement in this crisis. Thus, it is not surprising that the U.S. diplomatic corps invested all its
energy into implementing the peace agreement, and discounted the potentially catastrophic effects
of the failure to do so.
Yet, perversely, the pressure to implement the Arusha Accords was one of the key factors
exacerbating conflict and mutual distrust in Rwanda during the months leading up to the genocide.
U.S. diplomats disregarded many ominous signs of the Accords’ destabilizing impact on Rwandan
politics. For example:
•
•
•

•

President Habyarimana’s obvious antipathy toward the power-sharing agreement
mandated by the Arusha Accords and his reluctance to move toward the Accords’
implementation.
The rage of the Hutu-extremist CDR over its exclusion from the transitional government,
and CDR leaders’ public incitement of anti-Tutsi violence.
Population pressures and the ongoing economic crisis, exacerbated by falling global
commodity prices and the imposition of an economic austerity program by the International
Monetary Fund. These factors heightened fears that the prospective return of hundreds of
thousands of Tutsi refugees would threaten the livelihoods of Hutus—both farmers and
merchants.
Above all, the Burundi coup and massacres of civilians in October and November 1993,
which terrified Rwandan Hutu leaders about the prospect of sharing political and military
power with former Tutsi rebels.

In light of the escalating fears of Rwandan Hutus after the signing of the Arusha Accords,
especially after the outbreak of mass violence in neighboring Burundi, the international diplomatic
community might have been well-advised to suspend at least temporarily the implementation of
the Arusha Accords, and to focus instead on interim steps toward reestablishing physical security
and building trust among the rival factions in Rwanda. The report of August 1993 by B. W. Ndiaye,
the UN Special Rapporteur, offered a useful starting point for such a policy. Among Ndiaye’s
recommendations:
•

•

•

•

“Mechanism for the protection of civilian populations against massacres. A mechanism
for the protection of civilian populations against massacres should immediately be set up,
in terms of both prevention … and monitoring and intervention in cases of violence….
To this end, international teams of human rights observers and a civilian police force
might be established, particularly in high-risk areas; with the agreement of the Rwandese
authorities, they would be placed under international supervision.”
“National reconciliation campaign. A national reconciliation campaign should be
organized in order to attempt to eliminate the negative effects in people’s minds of the
odious disinformation advocating ethnic and political intolerance, hatred, and violence
which has been disseminated in the past. This campaign should begin with a solemn,
public commitment, in French and Kinyarwanda, by the Head of State, the Head of
Government, the leaders of all the political parties and the religious authorities to adopt a
policy of non-discrimination, national unity and respect for human rights…”
“Media-related action…. The reform of the media should take place in accordance with
the spirit of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the Contribution of the
Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion
of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War,
proclaimed on 28 November 1978 at the twentieth session of the General Conference of
UNESCO.”
“Dismantling of all violent organizations. All violent organizations should be dismantled
as a matter of urgency. Criminal organizations such as the ‘death squads,’ ‘Amasasu,’
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•

or ‘Network Zero,’ must be identified and dismantled, and their members prosecuted,
whatever their rank.”
“Combating impunity and compensating victims…. In describing the need to end the
vicious circle of impunity by rendering justice to the victims and their families, some
of the people with whom the Special Rapporteur spoke mentioned the need for ‘drastic
surgery’ in order to bring about genuine national reconciliation and eliminate the spectre
of a recurrence of the massacres…. History now seems to be repeating itself, and the errors
of the past should be avoided.”75

Bruce Jentleson has written: “Foreign policy is about making choices. The choice for preventive
diplomacy is politically difficult, the political constraints are serious ones; but they are potentially
malleable… The key, as it always has been and always will be, is executive leadership.”76 As the
proposals in Ndiaye’s report vividly illustrate, U.S. diplomats were not inevitably locked into the
policies that they pursued during the months leading up to the Rwandan genocide. They made
choices to adopt one set of policies, aimed at “democratization and conflict resolution,” rather than
another, that would have sought to build physical security and mutual trust as preconditions for
stable democratic rule.77 The obstacles to adopting this alternative course of action were not the lack
of imagination, nor the lack of knowledge, nor even primarily the lack of resources, because only
modest resources would have been required in order to begin to implement several of Ndiaye’s
proposals. Rather, the obstacles lay principally in the ways that U.S. foreign policy institutions
were “organized to think.” In order to work effectively to prevent atrocities, diplomats and senior
policymakers must learn to think anew about the nature and the urgency of this challenge.
Lessons Learned? The Path Forward
In the two decades since the Rwandan catastrophe, the U.S. government has adopted measures to
better anticipate and respond to emerging threats of genocide and mass atrocities, most notably
through President Obama’s establishment of the interagency Atrocity Prevention Board (APB) in
2012. This new administrative machinery for atrocities prevention within the U.S. government
has facilitated more robust and sustained attention to civil strife in countries of otherwise
peripheral interest to senior U.S. policymakers, including Burma, Kenya, Burundi, the Central
African Republic, and South Sudan.78
The creation of the APB, which convenes on a monthly basis to assess emerging threats of
genocide and mass atrocities around the world, has helped remedy some of the institutional
deficits that hampered U.S. analysis of the Rwandan crisis on the eve of the genocide. In particular:
•
•
•

75

The APB provides an institutional channel for communicating early warnings of potential
mass atrocities to the highest levels of the U.S. executive branch.
When warranted, the APB can provide a limited “surge capacity” for information gathering
and analysis concerning emerging threats—though its resources for such activities remain
restricted.
The APB applies an analytical lens focused specifically on the atrocity prevention mandate,
allowing it to complement the perspectives of analysts and diplomats who are focused
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on other national security priorities such as counterterrorism, security cooperation, or
democracy promotion. Thus its work can help illuminate the cognitive blind spots that
were evident in the U.S. government’s analysis of Rwandan politics before the genocide.79
Despite this important progress, the broader historical record of recent years—including the
commission of mass atrocities across large areas of Africa and the Middle East—suggests that
much still remains to be accomplished. Both of the factors that impaired U.S. government officials’
understanding of Rwanda in 1993-1994—faulty cognitive framing and rigid policy guidance—have
continued to impede U.S. atrocity prevention efforts in recent years.
Faulty Cognitive Framing
Just as the civil war frame led U.S. officials to underestimate the risk of mass violence against
Rwandan civilians in 1994, faulty framing has played a role in shaping U.S. policy toward North
Africa and the Middle East since the Arab Spring, as well as toward the newly independent nation of
South Sudan. For example, after the fall of Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, President
Obama and other senior U.S. officials applied a cognitive frame focusing on “democratization” to
the Libyan political transition, discounting evidence of growing threats of instability and danger
to civilians.
After rebel forces seized control of Tripoli in September 2011, President Obama congratulated
the people of Libya on “writing a new chapter in the life of their nation” by building “a future that
is free and democratic and prosperous.”80 By the following year, prospects for peace and security
in Libya had turned bleak. In September 2012, the U.S. Ambassador to Libya was assassinated in
Benghazi, and the International Crisis Group warned that Libya was devolving into “a country
of regions and localities pulling in different directions, beset by intercommunal strife and where
well-armed groups freely roam.”81 But President Obama remained upbeat. In his speech to the UN
General Assembly that month, he declared:
[E]ven as there will be huge challenges to come with a transition to democracy, I am
convinced that ultimately government of the people, by the people, and for the people is
more likely to bring about the stability, prosperity, and individual opportunity that serve as
a basis for peace in our world. So let us remember that this is a season of progress.82

With respect to South Sudan, U.S. and other international donors framed the situation
principally in terms of the challenges of state-building and “post-conflict reconstruction.” Unlike
Rwanda, which had attracted meager foreign assistance or high-level diplomatic attention during
the early 1990s, the new republic of South Sudan received billions of dollars of aid and intense
international scrutiny after achieving independence from Sudan in July 2011. Organizations
including the U.S. government, the UN, and international human rights groups closely monitored
developments in Sudan and South Sudan, watching for trouble signs in the disputed border
territories of Abyei and South Kordofan, in the pastoralist grazing corridors of Jonglei and Unity
states, and in other regions.
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Nonetheless, the implosion of the South Sudanese government in December 2013, when a civil
war erupted between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and those loyal to Vice President Riek
Machar, took most international observers by surprise. In the words of peacekeeping expert Alison
Giffen:
The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) had focused its protection efforts on early
warning, prevention, and support to the government of South Sudan to fulfill the state’s
responsibility to protect its people. But while Security Council members backed this
strategy, they didn’t adequately invest in its success through coordinated pressure on the
government of South Sudan to make reforms that could have prevented this crisis. This
approach to protecting civilians turned out to be foolishly idealistic and wholly inadequate
when government forces turned against their own citizens, opposition and irregular forces
rose up to join in the abuses, and communities committed crimes against their neighbors.83

A study on U.S. atrocity prevention efforts since 2011 found analogous shortcomings in the
U.S. government’s analytical work on this crisis: “The APB and others had devoted considerable
time over the months preceding the current political crisis to the potential threat of atrocities in
South Sudan, but focused on Jonglei State and elsewhere where there was inter-ethnic violence
rather than on Juba itself.”84
In both of these cases, international policymakers fell prey to the same type of cognitive
failures that had characterized the response to the Rwandan genocide. After the defeat and killing
of Qaddafi in 2011, the Libyan civil war was lauded as a successful “transition to democracy.”
President Obama and other international leaders disregarded signs of the country’s political
unraveling and growing civilian insecurity. After South Sudan achieved its independence, the UN
and other international donors oriented their policies around the objectives of state-building and
“post-conflict reconstruction.” They paid little heed to the possibility that the country’s leaders—
who had for decades fought in militias against, as well as alongside, each other—might take up
arms in a new civil war.
Rigid Policy Guidance
In cases of faulty cognitive framing, the inability to see a situation clearly can inhibit one’s ability
to act effectively to address it. Rigid policy guidance can contribute to the converse phenomenon:
the unwillingness to act can render one unable to see. In 2006, President Bill Clinton belatedly
acknowledged that he had not been “alive” to events in Rwanda during the genocide. Because
Clinton had ruled out supporting an international intervention to stop the violence, officials in his
administration shied away from discussing the events in Rwanda too precisely—for example by
avoiding public use of the word “genocide.”
This same tone of studied evasion may be found in some of President Obama’s pronouncements
on recent crises in North Africa and the Middle East. Obama came into office determined to end
his predecessor’s wars in the Middle East and Asia, not to begin new ones. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
when discussing situations in which he has decided not to intervene, he has steered clear of using
language that would imply the need for vigorous American action. Thus, in September 2012, he
saw a “season of progress” in Libya, even as other observers saw a nation on the brink of chaos.
With respect to the Syrian civil war, this pattern has been even more striking. At the rare
moments when Obama has advocated a muscular response to the Assad regime’s atrocities—
notably in the wake of its 2013 chemical weapons attacks on Syrian civilians—he has spoken
vividly and forcefully about the human suffering in the country.85 But apart from his speeches
about chemical weapons, Obama publicly discussed the Syrian crisis only five times in speeches
Giffen, Alison. 2014. “How the UN Should Handle South Sudan,” CNN, February 5. Available from: http://
globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/05/how-the-u-n-should-handle-south-sudan/ (accessed 14 January 2016).
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and presidential statements delivered between April 2011 and August 2014. The longest of these
statements was 700 words; most were considerably shorter. For example, in his annual address to
the UN General Assembly of September 2011, Obama devoted two paragraphs to discussing Syria.
On the same occasion the following year, Obama devoted three paragraphs to the Syrian conflict,
declaring that “the regime of Bashar al-Assad must come to an end so that the suffering of the
Syrian people can stop and a new dawn can begin.”86
Like the Rwandan genocide, the crises in Libya, South Sudan, and Syria were all intractable
conflicts that posed difficult challenges for international policymakers. Even the most robust and
enlightened policies would have had no guarantee of success, and might have given rise to perverse
unintended consequences. But any effective decision-making process must orient the policy to
address the facts on the ground, rather than reengineer the facts to meet the policy prescriptions.
In order to achieve any desired change, we must begin by paying attention to the problem. We
must be alive to the possibilities, both positive and negative. We must recognize that issues of
grand strategy and global security cannot be divorced from the mandate to defend individual
human lives.
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